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 Abstract- Recent positive political developments in the 
Korean peninsula are getting more attention from many 
political, economic, and military options. The Six Party 
talk is obviously the one. The Six Party talks to achieve 
optimal supply chain that has taken place over the past 
decade have been the only real progress, making a 
diplomatic tool that has sought to stem nuclear 
proliferation within the Korean peninsula. However, 
considerable doubt exists as to how effective they have 
been and whether they remain a relevant means by 
which the issue can be solved. This paper looks at events 
that have transpired over the course of the talks for 
supply chain and contextualizes how beneficial they 
have been. It is critical of the parties involved for their 
individualistic attitudes towards the talks and places 
particular emphasis on China and the U.S in its 
assessment of the extent to which the parties are 
working towards the stated goals. Since the talks for 
achieving optimal supply chain stalled in 2009, 
relationships in and around the Korean Peninsula have 
become increasingly strained with Kim Jong Un 
assuming the role as North Korean leader, a series of 
attacks as well as weapons testing, it is now highly 
relevant that an assessment of diplomatic methods be 
made. The paper concludes that while the talks for 
supply chain offer potentially the fairest and swiftest 
resolution of the issues, the parties involved are 
exploring independent means of coercion before they 
will resume. Finally, with North Korean ties as strained 
as ever, it is set out that a return to diplomacy will 
unlikely herald a rapid Change in the security and 
political environment. 
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 The main aim of The Six-Party Talks for achieving 
supply chain is to end North Korea’s nuclear program 
using a peaceful negotiation process. They were 
initiated in May 2003 after North Korea withdrew 
from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and 
the parties involved include the United States, the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North 
Korea), China, Russia, the Republic of Korea (South 
Korea) and Japan. The Six-Party talks for managing 
supply chain have been the preferred formula of 
solving the nuclear Challenge but the future is 
pessimistic since the forum does not seem as if it will 
achieve its goal. From a Chinese perspective 
specifically, the importance of the talks for supply 
chain seems to be falling as other diplomatic 
pressures, which from its unique position it is able to 
instigate, seem to have had greater impact on the 
regional environment. Although there was progress 
made after the fourth and fifth rounds of talks, recent 
external events have reversed it [12]. This document 
will critically analyze the future of Six-Party talk as 
well as the available options and prospects for the 
parties involved.  
 Recent positive political developments in Korean 
peninsula are getting more attention from many 
political, economic, and military options. The Six 
Party talk is obviously the one. But, the six party talk 
had very little progress was made from 2003 to 2007 
even as the parties engaged in five rounds of 
intensive talks. The greatest achievement was 
experienced during the third phase of the fifth round 
after North Korea decided to close its nuclear plants. 
This would be followed by fuel aid to North Korea as 
well as a process of normalizing international 
relations with Japan and the U.S. However, in 2009, 
North Korea unsuccessfully launched a satellite and 
the president of the United Nations Security Council 
issued a strict statement condemning North Korea for 
going against the agreements. On 14 April 2009, after 
the presidential statement, North Korea made an 
angry response declaring that it would withdraw as a 
party to the Six-Party Talks as well as recommence 
its enrichment of nuclear materials so as to advance 
its nuclear deterrent. In addition, North Korea 
expelled from the country all of the foreign nuclear 
inspectors. 
 It is clear that since the Six-Party Talks for achieving 
optimal supply chain were initiated in 2003, there 
have been several problems which have limited 
progress. The negotiations have particularly been 
obstructed by diplomatic standoffs especially 
between North Korea and the U.S. The most 
significant of which was experienced when North 
Korea decided to stop the disablement process that 
had been agreed upon and reopened the Yongbyon 
nuclear facility. The Obama administration and the 
other four countries involved have consistently tried 
to bring North Korea back to the negotiation table to 
ensure that the talks do not disintegrate completely. 
The United Nations has also been actively involved 
______________________________________________________________ 
International Journal of Supply Chain Management 
IJSCM, ISSN: 2050-7399 (Online), 2051-3771 (Print) 
Copyright © ExcelingTech Pub, UK (http://excelingtech.co.uk/) 
 
771 
Vol. 7, No. 5, October 2018 Int. J Sup. Chain. Mgt 
 
 
in trying to halt the missile and nuclear tests by North 
Korea to ensure that the talks for supply chain can 
bear fruit. The Council on Foreign Relations believes 
that regional partnerships between the Northeast 
Asian countries and the United States are the best 
vehicle to create stable relationships and peaceful 
negotiations regarding the future of the Korean 
peninsula [1]. 
 
2. The Framework 
  
 For the future of the Six-Party Talks to be put into 
perspective and be clearly understood, it is important 
to analyze the trends of the negotiations which lead to 
their commencement. The talks for gaining were 
initiated in 2003 after then U.S. President George W. 
Bush had reversed a policy of direct negotiation with 
Pyongyang, a policy endorsed by his predecessor, 
President Bill Clinton. In 2002, during President 
Bush’s State of Union address, North Korea was 
included as part of the “Axis of Evil.” And by 
October of the same year, the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) had said that North Korea was 
enriching its uranium program. The hard-line 
diplomatic strategy of the US that followed, 
repeatedly angered North Korea and became one of 
the first major negative influences on the existing 
negotiation process tasked at ensuring Pyongyang 
stops its enrichment programs. Moreover, 
Washington said that North Korea was violating the 
spirit of the 1994 Agreed Framework where the U.S. 
had promised to build two light-water reactors and 
provide fuel (oil) in exchange for Pyongyang halting 
its plutonium enrichment program. The factors which 
were significantly limiting the progress of the talks 
were mainly diplomatic, with the U.S. and North 
Korea taking opposing stands.  
 As a result of such pressures, North Korea declared 
in 2003 that it will not end its enrichment program 
until the U.S. had agreed to normalize relations and 
to hold bilateral talks for achieving supply chain. 
After Washington rejected these demands, North 
Korea removed itself from the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), expelled inspectors 
from the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) and resumed its enrichment program.  
 This was a major setback to talks for supply chain 
and nations threw accusations at each other which 
further halted the negotiation process. In addition, 
tensions mounted significantly, and each nation was 
eager to see how the others would react. For instance, 
a North Korean fighter jet intercepted a U.S. spy 
plane over the Sea of Japan in 2003, while the U.S., 
China and North Korea held bilateral talks in April 
2003 in Beijing. Such negotiations precluded the first 
round of talks bringing other players – Japan, South 
Korea and Russia to participate in negotiations.   
 After several rounds of talks around of supply chain, 
a significant agreement was reached in September 
2005, and North Korea decided to halt its nuclear 
enrichment program. 
 
3. Stop-and-Go Negotiations 
 
 The Six-Party Talks are built on the back of the 
Helsinki Process which is the implementation of the 
Helsinki Final Act signed by NATO and Warsaw 
Pact countries dating back to 1975. The act sets out 
the values for the creation of strong international 
relations by placing emphases on non-intervention 
and sovereignty as a structure for long term 
improvements. These values are placed over the 
short-term needs of humanitarian issues such as 
human rights. By ensuring national security and 
encouraging engagement with the international 
community, the Helsinki process would work 
towards building a willingness to Change within the 
DPRK. Much like the sunshine policy initiated by 
South Korea’s Kim Dae Jung (a policy with led to his 
receiving of the Nobel Peace Prize) this framework is 
in stark contrast to the current international position 
which seeks to pressure North Korea to a breaking 
point where it will involuntarily cooperate with the 
agenda of the international community. Since then, 
South Korean President Lee Myung Bak’s 
abandonment of the Sunshine Policy, following a 
2006 nuclear test by the North, international relations 
between not only the South and the North but 
between North and all other international actors have 
deteriorated significantly, and in part evidences the 
need for more diplomacy. 
 In September 2005, North Korea signed a pact, 
which said that it would stop its nuclear program, re-
enter the NPT and permit monitors from IAEA to 
return. In addition, other members would provide 
North Korea with energy and food assistance. These 
agreements also paved the way for the normalization 
of North Korea’s relations with the U.S and Japan 
and for the creation of a peaceful agreement within 
the Korean peninsula. In November 2005, the 
agreements collapsed after restrictions were placed 
on the Macao-based Delta Asia Financial Group by 
the United States Treasury Department. Washington 
accused it of fraud and of laundering North Korean 
funds to the tune of $25 million. Close to fifty 
Pyongyang accounts held in the banks were frozen by 
the Macanese government. With negotiations having 
disintegrated, North Korea continued its provocative 
programs. In July 2006, it conducted missile tests and 
in October of the same year, it carried out nuclear 
tests leading China to put pressure on it to rejoin the 
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talks. A Denuclearization Plan was created by 
member countries during the sixth round of talks 
about supply chain in July 2007. This was a process 
seen by Washington as a means to reinitiate the 
September 2005 statement. Moreover, North Korea 
was asked to halt its nuclear enrichment program in 
return for aid as well as the frozen Banco Delta Asia 
funds. An agreement was reached after negotiations 
which included bilateral talks between the U.S. and 
North Korea. These talks bore fruits and the 
negotiation process was once again on a positive 
track [19].  
 At this time, the future and prospects of the Six-
Party Talk were bright and options for the parties 
involved also seemed numerous. For instance, the 
denuclearization program by July 2007 had gained 
momentum and North Korea had closed its main 
plutonium production facility at Yongbyon in return 
for diplomatic concessions and aid. 8,000 fuel rods 
were removed from the nuclear reactor at Yongbyon 
under the watchful eyes of American experts [19] and 
in May 2008, close to 18,000 pages of documents 
were handed to the U.S. by North Korea detailing 
how their nuclear programs were being implemented.  
After the Yongbyon nuclear plant cooling tower was 
imploded, the U.S. removed North Korea’s 
restrictions from the Trading with the Enemy Act. In 
October, Pyongyang agreed to some verification 
processes and this led to the U.S. removing it from 
the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. However, this 
process did not end without critics accusing the Bush 
administration of letting off North Korea before all 
measures were fulfilled. For instance, the critics say 
that North Korea failed on three fundamental 
accounts: failing to give details of uranium 
enrichment suspected in some regions; failure to 
address the proliferation activities by Pyongyang in 
other nations such as Libya and Syria; and failing 
give details on nuclear weapons that has already been 
manufactured [19]. Although setbacks were 
experienced intermittently, all parties were in 
agreement that the objectives of the negotiations 
would be reached in an amicable manor. Although 
North Korea had agreed to most of the requirements 
set forth by the negotiations, some agreements took 
lengthy periods of time to be implemented. For 
instance, Pyongyang had still not accepted the 
verification procedure for its nuclear program even as 
the term of the Bush administration came to an end. 
However, all parties continued to avoid taking hard-
line stances since they did not want to risk a collapse 
of the negotiations.  
 When Obama was elected as the new U.S. president, 
Washington showed early signals that it was willing 
to engage Pyongyang in direct negotiations. 
However, analysts say that North Korea has on 
several occasions been the culprit often going against 
the agreements of the Six-party talks for supply 
chain. For instance, in May 2009, Pyongyang went 
ahead with its multiple missile tests as well as nuclear 
tests. This resulted in the U.S. asking for a new 
United Nations Security Council Resolution which 
would impose tougher sanctions on North Korea. 
When the then President of South Korea Lee Myung-
bak visited the U.S. in June, President Obama said 
that he was still willing to engage North Korea in 
negotiations [20]. However, he added that 
provocative and belligerent behavior that is 
threatening to other countries will be dealt with 
through serious and significant enforcement of 
sanctions. Such provocative behavior has continued 
and perhaps accelerated over the last few years, and 
as the U.S. and the international community have 
acted to step up pressure on Pyongyang it has become 
increasingly unlikely the stalled talks to achieve 
optimal supply chain will result in any progress for 
the foreseeable future. 
 
4. Objectives of the Involved Parties 
 
 Each country in the Six-Party Talks has individual 
goals, but the ultimate goal of the talks can be 
generally said to be ensuring that the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons is curtailed [1]. For the U.S., the 
Six-Party Talks for managing supply chain are a 
means of showing to the world that the nuclear 
program of North Korea is an international problem 
and not just an issue that can be tackled by bilateral 
negotiations. While Washington is also concerned 
with the poor human rights record that is present in 
the communist state of North Korea, its major 
concerns are Pyongyang’s nuclear enrichment 
program and a possible sale of nuclear technology 
and weapons to terrorist groups and hostile countries 
[1]. According to reports from Washington, all 
agreements from the Six-Party Talks must be 
implemented by North Korea and IAEA monitors 
must be allowed to carry out investigations in the 
country.  
 North Korea is considered a reclusive state by other 
parties and this is the main reason why the Six–Party 
Talks were initiated. In the case of North Korea, 
regime theory provides a strong assessment of 
international relations; describing how the actions of 
regimes have an influence on one another. With the 
actions of one state having long term impacts 
globally, it would be assumed that each state would 
cooperate to promote its own interests. With its 
actions being routinely described as a rogue or 
unpredictable by the international media, an 
understanding of how it has to come to fall outside of 
the scope of regime theory allows us to appreciate its 
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interactions. For North Korea, threatened the 
sovereignty and particularly the lack of international 
recognition for the authority of its ruling family, are 
the most significant and pressing issues. Without 
insurances from the international community there is 
no framework for the softening of its relations. On 
top of this, domestic pressures and an 
underdeveloped economy mean that the Pyongyang 
is heavily dependent on external powers. Without 
guarantees for North Korean sovereignty and with a 
need for aid to ensure internal security, North Korea 
is being forced to solicit its support through extortion. 
The only way it can do this is through the bolstering 
of its nuclear program and through the escalation of 
international tensions. Its nuclear enrichment 
program has not been received well and the United 
States has been the biggest opponent; calling for 
increased sanctions against the country. However, 
North Korea wants the U.S. to pledge a 
nonaggression security program taking into 
consideration that America has deployed over 25,000 
troops in South Korea; to normalize is international 
relations with Washington; as well as the Six-Party 
countries to provide it with unrestricted access to 
economic aid. Moreover, Pyongyang also hopes that 
the two light-water receptors that were agreed upon 
in the 1994 Agreed Framework will be completed as 
soon as possible.  
 Another country that plays a significant role in the 
Six-Party Talks is South Korea, especially when it is 
considered that South and North Korea have been 
engaged in unresolved conflict. The ultimate 
objective of South Korea is to see that the Korean 
peninsula has been denuclearized and reunified. In 
addition, Seoul wants to ensure that there is no 
sudden Change in political regime in Pyongyang 
[20]. This is because South Korea would have to bear 
a sudden influx of refugees across its borders, 
creating an economic burden and derogating internal 
security. China is also a significant player in the talks 
since Beijing and Pyongyang have been major 
trading partners and long-standing allies. Aside from 
historical ties with the Korean peninsula and 
ideological parallels, for China North Korea has 
served a buffer zone to U.S troops located in South 
Korea and, just like Seoul, Beijing fears that there 
would be a sudden rush of refugees across its borders 
if North Korea became destabilized therefore pushing 
it to be a key provider of food and energy assistance. 
With such factors impacting their relationship, the 
influence China holds has been repeatedly used to 
urge North Korea to return to the negotiating-table 
whenever the talks collapse. China has been slow 
when it comes to implementing tough UN sanctions 
against North Korea, though such a policy has been 
changing in response to North Korea’s actions under 
Kim Jong Un. The position of Russia in the Six-Party 
Talks for achieving supply chain enables it to reassert 
its influence in Northeast Asia and also address the 
issue of refugee flow. Moscow has also joined hands 
with China in restricting tough UN sanctions against 
North Korea. As with its successes in halting U.S. 
intervention in Syria, Russia may well look to place 
itself between the U.S. and North Korea – a position 
which would diminish the U.S. presence within the 
region. Russia has remained a key ally of North 
Korea since the outbreak of the Korean War and its 
involvement in diplomatic talks may increase in light 
of such developments. 
 When it comes to Japan, Tokyo is worried that North 
Korean missiles have the ability of reaching its 
borders - U.S. bases in the country are potentially 
high value targets for North Korea. In addition, the 
Six-Party Talks are a platform in which it can 
pressure North Korea to admit to the abduction of 
Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s [18]. The 
issue of spies is a divisive one between Japan and the 
U.S. - Tokyo opposes the U.S. decision to remove 
North Korea from the U.S. list of sponsors of 
terrorism as its abduction issue remains unresolved. 
On the other hand, Pyongyang has on several 
occasions demanded that Japan be excluded from the 
talks. 
 
5. Obstacles to the talks of supply chain 
  
 The future successes of the Six-Party Talks around 
supply chain seem limited due to the obstacles which 
the parties are exposed to. Each party is coming to 
the negotiating table with individual demands which 
at times seem unrealistic given the requirements and 
desires of the other parties. The United States and 
North Korea are the major players in the talk, and 
both seem to hold broadly-speaking hardliner 
positions opposed by the other party. In addition, 
countries such as Japan and North Korea have issues 
which are not related to the core purpose of the talks 
and as such are weakening the effectiveness of 
negotiations. For example, Japan opposed the 
removal of North Korea from the list of terrorist 
supporters due to the argument that Pyongyang 
played a role in the abduction of Japanese citizens 
during the cold war. North Korea has also opposed 
on several occasions the inclusion of Japan in the 
negotiations arguing that the country has already 
taken an opposing position and has not come to 
negotiate [2].  
 What are the options and prospects of the talks 
around supply chain management when the 
negotiations are exposed to all these obstacles? 
Critics argue that the Six-Party Talks only have the 
capacity of managing temporarily the North Korean 
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nuclear problem. The future of the talks and the long 
run outcome depends mainly on the ability of the 
parties to solve the intrinsic challenges. 
 First, the major obstacle that needs to be tackled 
immediately is the unpredictable nature of the North 
Korean regime. Pyongyang has often shifted its 
position when it comes to bilateral talks. The U.S. 
finds North Korea’s erraticism indicative of a lack of 
sincerity with regards to negotiations and also an 
indication of weakness as a result of its perceived 
desperation. According to Washington’s former 
envoy to the talks Christopher Hill, North Korea 
understands that the United States has a hard time 
figuring out what motivates Pyongyang to behave so 
erratically and thus they want to continue acting the 
same in the foreseeable future [2]. The second 
stumbling block to the talks is the different 
approaches taken by the Six-Party countries. Scott 
Snyder, a senior fellow for the Council on Foreign 
Relations, said that the Six-Party nations and other 
regional efforts were unable to tackle the North 
Korean nuclear challenge since they preferred to 
place their immediate concerns and priorities ahead 
of the collective priority of disarmament of the 
nuclear program in North Korea. For instance, Japan 
and the U.S have called for strong sanctions against 
North Korea in answer to weapon testing, whereas 
China, Russia and South Korea have sought less 
stringent sanctions due to the belief that toppling of 
the regime would lead to the sudden influx of 
refugees. Third, the United States has rejected the 
bilateral negotiations on the belief that nuclear 
proliferation is a severe problem and because it has 
no desire to be the only party involved in dissolving 
any future crises on the peninsula. In addition, with 
international condemnation and pressures, the U.S. 
has to far less compromise its own position in any 
negotiation. 
 Washington had preferred a Six-Party Talk approach 
so that negotiations and compromises with the regime 
can be viewed as part of multilateral negotiations. 
However, North Korea demanded one-on-one talks 
with the United States as a precondition of freezing 
its nuclear program. Hill made a surprise visit to 
North Korea in June 2007 to push forward a deal 
agreed upon in February. This reversed the stance 
held by the United States on direct talks with North 
Korea. Another stumbling block to the talks is regime 
succession in North Korea. In May 2008, Kim Jong-
II suffered a stroke and analysts argue that actions 
taken by North Korea have been influenced by 
domestic politics. The director of the CFR, Center for 
Preventive Action, Paul B. Stares said that diplomatic 
initiatives in the future can only be successful if the 
nuclear issue is tackled on the basis that “regime 
survival” is separate from national security. He adds 
that Washington may find it necessary to put up 
measures that will assure the Kim family regime of it 
survival in the future [13].  
 
6. Ways of tackling the policy puzzle 
  
 Despite the fact that talks of this nature have been 
held for over a decade, no significant results are yet 
to be experienced among all the party states. 
Unification and denuclearization of the Korean 
peninsular region are still distant and both the north 
and south are yet to resolve their inherent conflict. 
The U.S. held a hardliner position throughout most of 
the Bush regime, refusing to negotiate directly with 
North Korea. However, even after it began bilateral 
talks with Pyongyang, no tangible benefits have been 
felt and North Korea continues to enrich its nuclear 
programs and to test missiles. The United Nations 
Security Council has been vocal in condemning the 
nuclear program in North Korea. But it seems even 
its demands have fallen on deaf ears and the 
sanctions have been ineffective in derailing nuclear 
enrichment in the communist country [19]. 
Moreover, most experts feel that the erratic position 
taken by North Korea has been effective in ensuring 
that the Six-Party Talks of supply chain are not 
successful, in addition, China, Russia and South 
Korea are unable to call for stringent sanction 
measures due to the fear of instability in the region 
and a sudden influx of refugees. North Korea is in 
fact buying time and ensuring that the talks are 
derailed in the process. With time, there are hopes 
that the U.S. will reduce its stringent conditions or 
some of the parties in the talks will support the 
position it has taken [5]. Analysts believe that North 
Korea is now determined to ensure that the 
international community recognizes it as a nuclear 
weapons state instead of negotiating for the 
eradication of its nuclear enrichment program.  
 [9], Former U.S. Secretary of State, wrote in the 
Washington Post that diplomacy among the Six-Party 
Talks is now an issue of whether the objective is to 
eliminate or manage North Korea’s nuclear program. 
He adds that any policy that fails to eliminate the 
nuclear ability of North Korea’s military, will 
effectively consent to its continuation. In May 2009, 
North Korea removed itself from the Six-Party Talks 
but the Obama administration continued negotiations 
with the rest of the party members to show that it has 
not denounced denuclearization of Pyongyang.  
 According to a Congressional Research Service 
report in 2009, if the Obama administration decides 
to restore negotiation tracks with the Pyongyang, it 
would be an effective means of restoring strict 
bilateral negotiation terms between the U.S and 
North Korea. However, most experts are of the 
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opinion that although little results have been yielded 
through the multilateral approach, it still remains as 
the best means of negotiations. Charles Pritchard, a 
special envoy from 2001-2003 negotiating with 
North Korea says that bilateral (US-North Korea) 
negotiations worked the best and were effective in 
producing major results in a relatively short period of 
time [15]. However, very few experts believe that the 
intention of North Korea is to give up on its nuclear 
enrichment program [15].  
For a very long period of time, North Korea has 
always wanted to be allowed by the international 
community to further its nuclear program. The 
country has already reached the status of 
industrialized nations and believes that it has the 
capacity of producing and managing effectively, 
nuclear power. As such, it does not intend to give up 
on a program that has been tested effectively by its 
experts. During the Bush administration, the deputy 
chief of the U.S. delegation to the Six-Party Talks, 
Victor Cha, wrote in the Washington Post that the 
talks do not have the capacity of attaining what 
Pyongyang or Washington wants [22]. Therefore, the 
main objective of the Six-Party Talks is to contain the 
threat of proliferation, manage the problem and 
ensure that the clock of the regime runs out. It is 
important to note then that at this stage it appears 
both parties are not eager for immediate resolution 
and feel that given more time the situation will 
become more favorable to them.   
 
7. Chinese Perspective: Why Six-Party Talks 
around supply chain have not succeeded 
  
 Most international negotiations are faced with 
individual hurdles, but they are solved over a period 
of time. Why then have the talks failed to bear fruit 
after such a long period of time? Critics say that there 
are different perspectives relating to each party in the 
talks, which have made the Six-Party Talks around 
supply chain unsuccessful [27].  
 Some of the most common factors are attributed to 
the major players in the talks – the U.S., North Korea 
and China [25]. In addition, since a peaceful process 
was decided upon to end the Pyongyang nuclear 
program, most analysts believe that North Korea has 
failed to take actions because they do not expect 
military intervention. From a Chinese perspective, 
the talks have failed to bear fruit since Pyongyang 
considers its nuclear program as a shield from U.S. 
strategies of regime change. When Condoleezza 
Rice, former U.S. Secretary of State, visited the East 
Asian region, a covert signal was sent to Beijing that 
it was time for other options to be considered to 
tackle the North Korean problem. Despite the fact 
that the Six-Party Talks are the most preferred 
process of solving the nuclear issue with North 
Korea, the perception of the forum’s ability to 
achieve its objectives remains pessimistic.  
If Washington sees that Pyongyang has refused to act 
even after being given several options, Beijing may 
be forced use a “Plan B” option championed by the 
U.S., although it is not yet clear what the plan may 
entail. Analysts believe that the Six-Party Talks for 
achieving supply chain have been unsuccessful 
because North Korea is determined to ensure that 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) remain as a 
countermeasure against any strategy which may be 
used by the United States to implement radical 
regime change. However, within the negotiating 
parties, there are several differences in priorities and 
goals and this is a major factor when it comes to 
putting pressure on North Korea. A peaceful means 
has already been agreed upon to denuclearize 
Pyongyang. However, to China, eradicating the 
nuclear program in North Korea is a secondary goal 
when compared with war avoidance.  
In February 2009, concerns were raised by Beijing on 
the most effective process of solving the dispute and 
this is because the matter seems to be affecting 
directly its national security. First, Pyongyang said 
that any other process apart from negotiated 
agreement may escalate tensions to a point where 
nations are provoked into war. Beijing took these 
comments very seriously because if war erupts, it 
would have disastrous effects on China. Therefore, 
prevention of war is a matter that must be guarded at 
all costs on the part of Beijing. Preventions of war by 
China may contravene the priority of the U.S. of 
ensuring that the Korean peninsula is denuclearized 
at all costs [3].  
Although this does not explicitly outline that the U.S. 
may use war when negotiations fail, there may be 
some implications that it may be used to ensure that 
Korean peninsula is free of nuclear weapons. At the 
moment, military intervention is not an option for 
Washington, but this may be considered eventually if 
it seems that the multilateral actions are not going 
anywhere. The sequence of future events will have a 
significant impact on the Six-Party Talks mechanism 
and its long-term outcome.  
However, this will have an indirect benefit to 
Pyongyang since during this time North Korea is able 
to enrich its nuclear program and weaponize its 
atomic materials in any way it wants. In addition, 
emphasis on non-military interventions implies that 
Beijing will support the security concerns of 
Pyongyang as the only means of finding an amicable 
and viable solution. Suggesting that Beijing supports 
the written form of security guarantees by 
Washington as a necessary means of the Six-Party 
Talks to achieve its goals. In addition, security 
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guarantees by Washington as well as a promise for 
compensation may facilitate Pyongyang’s removal of 
nuclear facilities via an interim freezing phase, a 
process that has been initiated previously albeit to an 
unsuccessful conclusion.   
  
8. U.S. strategy towards North Korea 
  
 While there are several strategies proposed by party 
members on the most efficient ways of solving the 
Pyongyang deadlock, they tend to differ greatly. For 
instance, the United States and Japan support tough 
sanctioning of North Korea, while the rest of the 
party members support less intensive measures. For a 
long period, the U.S. had rejected North Korea’s 
proposal of a bilateral approach to the negotiation, 
but Washington has in-part reversed its stand so as to 
solve the nuclear problem. Meanwhile, Pyongyang 
has not honored agreements and its nuclear 
enrichment program, as well as its testing of missiles, 
is still ongoing. A peaceful process was agreed upon 
in the Six-Party Talks for managing supply chain but 
tangible fruits are yet to be experienced and the 
future does not seem so bright [25], [26].  
This leads analysts to question the effectiveness of 
the forum and the process being used to solve the 
Pyongyang issue. Some say that the objectives of 
party members are centered on individual priorities 
and not on the collective goal of solving the nuclear 
problem.  
The strategy of the U.S. seems unpredictable because 
it is one of the most influential parties in the talks. 
What will happen if the U.S. decides to use military 
intervention to ensure that the Korean peninsula is 
denuclearized?  Analysts believe that the use of 
power cannot be sanctioned by the other party 
members (aside perhaps Japan) due to intrinsic 
issues. However, it is evident that either elimination 
or management of North Korea’s nuclear program 
must be decided in the near future [21]. Therefore, 
the U.S may develop specific objectives for North 
Korea which may not necessarily be endorsed by Six-
Party members.   
A peaceful negotiation process in the long-run may 
be at odds with Washington’s objectives in North 
Korea. This is because according to the U.S., 
maximization of pressure is the only solution that 
will bring North Korea to a sensible assessment of 
the plight that it is in, both locally and internationally. 
There has to be a military threat that will have to be 
considered inevitable in the future. It is impossible to 
totally rule out a pre-emptive strike. The U.S. 
military has been involved in Iraq for a number of 
years demonstrating perhaps Washington’s ability to 
tolerate divisive stall tactics employed by North 
Korea. In addition, the U.S. needs some time to 
develop its strategy if it is to engage North Korea 
aggressively [16]. Therefore, for now, the Six-Party 
Talks remain the best solution of dealing with 
Pyongyang’s nuclear problem.  
However, the situation will have to change in the 
future if the peaceful negotiation fails to be 
successful. In Iraq, the situation has already come 
under relative control, and there is a high possibility 
that the Six-Party Talks can convince the U.S. to start 
considering other options that will put pressure on 
Pyongyang. The security of North Korea does not 
concern the United States since the aim of 
Washington is to ensure that South Korea is not 
exposed to the powers of tyrants [18]. For a very long 
period, South Korea has been one of America’s 
closest allies and more than 25,000 troops of the U.S. 
military are deployed in the country [6]. This is one 
way of ensuring that any tactics employed by 
Pyongyang do not succeed in the Korean peninsula. 
Although North Korea wants to be recognized as a 
nuclear state, both the Six-Party states and the 
international community are not prepared to allow a 
situation that may lead to nuclear proliferation. 
The U.S. has played a significant role in East Asia in 
ensuring peace and stability in the region. The UN 
Security Council has also kept a watchful eye and has 
ensured that international agreements are respected 
by all countries. The U.S. government has been at the 
forefront of ensuring that weapons of mass 
destruction do not get into the hands of terrorist 
groups or hostile states. During the Bush 
administration, a written security agreement with 
North Korea was ideologically unacceptable and 
politically risky. The current Obama administration 
has softened its stand and it has called on North 
Korea to dismantle its nuclear program through a 
peaceful process. The U.S. had already promised 
enough compensation to North Korea in return for 
dismantling of Pyongyang’s nuclear activities.  
After the failure of the agreed framework, the U.S. 
learned a lesson that even when peace negotiations 
are on the right track, they may encounter stumbling 
blocks at any given time and disintegrate. Therefore, 
it is only logical for the U.S. to demand a complete, 
irreversible and verifiable dismantling of the nuclear 
program without a provisional phase of breezing [4]. 
Analysts say that the U.S. government is actually 
seeking for the application of the Libyan model to the 
nuclear enrichment program in North Korea. 
According to John Bolton, a former U.S. envoy, 
Libya was not compensated by the U.S. after it ended 
its weapons of mass destruction program [24].  
 However, it was allowed to rejoin the international 
community and this is enough compensation. 
Therefore, Pyongyang has placed a very high price 
for it to end its nuclear enrichment program, this 
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form of extortion should not be accepted in the Six-
Party Talks around supply chain. The current North 
Korean administration accused its predecessor of 
corruption that led to Pyongyang finalizing the 
Agreed Framework. Beijing has not said any word 
concerning the Libyan model, but analysts say that 
China does not think that it can become applicable in 
the North Korean situation.  
To start with North Korea seems not particularly care 
whether or not it is returned to the international 
community. Its primary goal is ensuring that the 
current regime is sustained, it is interesting to note 
the subsequent collapse of the Libyan regime, 
whether or not it was influenced by changes in 
international policies. In addition, Libya is a major 
exporter of oil and it can therefore use these revenues 
to sustain itself, in fact, it needs access to the 
international marketplace to sell those resources. On 
the other hand, North Korea still depends on aid and 
compensation. Analysts say that Kim Jong-Il cannot 
benefit from the Libyan model. This is the main 
reason why Chinese analysts argue that it is almost 
impossible for Pyongyang to dismantle its nuclear 
enrichment program without enough compensation 
[23].  
 
9. Washington vs. Beijing: Six-Party Talks to 
Achieve Optimal Supply Chain  
 
 It is quite evident from all the parties in the talks that 
there exists consensus in a desire to end the 
negotiation process peacefully. The objectives of 
individual parties tend to differ, but the fundamental 
goal of the talks is to eradicate the nuclear program in 
Pyongyang. Washington and Beijing have played 
significant roles in pressurizing North Korea to 
participate in the talks and eradicate enrichment of 
nuclear power [17]. However, from the objectives of 
the two nations, critics argue that the U.S. is calling 
for tougher measures while China is advocating for a 
smooth way of dealing with the problem. Irrespective 
of the differences in goals between the U.S. and 
China, analysts believe that the Six-Party Talks have 
a significant impact on the future of the Korean 
peninsula. If the issue of regime change in North 
Korea is the only unshakeable policy of the U.S., 
after a period of time, China will eventually change 
its stand.  
Pyongyang is already becoming a liability to China 
and that the long-term strategy of Beijing is for North 
Korea reunify with South Korea. In 2013, there has 
been a clear shift in China’s policy towards North 
Korea, with the North continuing to disobey U.N. 
sanctions, China’s patience appears to have run thin. 
China took a key role in drafting the most recent 
sanctions and their impact of officials in North 
Korea, shows a far less tolerant Chinese policy. 
However, China’s immediate goal remains to ensure 
that North Korea is preserved and stable. Sources 
from China say that this is a means of ensuring that 
the nuclear problem is resolved through a peaceful 
process. In another twist, just like the way 
Washington is using the Beijing to pressurize 
Pyongyang, North Korea may be used by China 
against the U.S. For example, Beijing has been able 
to maintain a cordial relationship with the U.S. due to 
the presence of Pyongyang. Beijing has been able to 
extract support from the U.S. for its Taiwan policy 
through actions on the North Korean issue. 
Therefore, at the moment, North Korea can be 
maintained and this is worth the amount of huge 
economic aid that China gives to North Korea.   
North Korea stands to lose heavily if it severs its ties 
with China and this implies that it often bows to 
pressure from Beijing. Over the last two years, 
newfound North Korean aggression seems to have 
gone heavily against the will of the its ally, if North 
Korea now believes its nuclear deterrent to be 
sufficient, it may be looking to heighten tensions and 
instigate a new round of diplomacy on its own terms. 
China is of the opinion that if the U.S. provides 
enough compensation and provides a written security 
guarantee; Pyongyang will eventually budge, even if 
it would be reluctant. Generally, Kim Jong-Un is not 
looking to severe relations with the United States nor 
does he desperately need nuclear weapons. The most 
important thing for him is finance that will enable 
him to reform the national economy and thus ensure 
the survival of his regime. Since cash and security are 
the most urgent needs of Pyongyang, Chinese 
analysts are wondering whether Washington really 
wants the nuclear problem to be resolved [10]. In 
addition, the Six-Party member states know that what 
can most quickly dismantle the repressive Kim 
regime is internal pressure and instability and not 
external threats, although sanctions will go some way 





 Is the U.S. willing to provide economic aid and 
security guarantees being demanded by North Korea? 
Most analysts think that Washington is reluctant and 
it is not possible for it to concede to the requests. 
Given, the domestic financial concerns in the U.S. it 
is unlikely that even if this were to provide a real and 
even cost effective solution that it would be approved 
by the U.S. House and/or Senate. However, it is 
impossible for Pyongyang to dismantle the nuclear 
program if it fails to get what it has demanded. Under 
such conditions, it seems that nothing much will be 
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gained even when North Korea participates actively 
in the negotiations [10]. Asking Kim’s regime to 
dismantle the nuclear program without providing 
proper compensation will not bear any fruits. 
Analysts believe that the talks will drag for a very 
lengthy period and not much will be achieved. When 
the Six-Party Talks become unsuccessful, then China 
will be exposed to other forms challenges. First, the 
U.S will demand that Beijing reduces the amount of 
aid and compensations it gives to North Korea [14].  
 Moreover, China is slowing being pushed into a 
position where it must back UN Security Council and 
support heavy sanctioning. Therefore, Beijing will be 
at crossroads – whether to support international 
demands or ensure regional stability and wellbeing of 
North Korea. Between the United States and China, 
priority differences are hitherto hidden due to the 
common goal that they are after. However, if the Six-
Party Talks collapse, these differences will eventually 
come out in the open. In addition, when the peaceful 
negotiations fail to bear fruits, Washington will be 
bound to embark on another course of action.  
 Therefore, a new initiative by the U.S. will definitely 
put to a test the smooth and cordial Sino-U.S. 
relations. North Korea has made several backtracking 
promises to China and this may be the main reason 
why that relation between the two countries is not as 
close as in the past. Analysts believe that Kim’s 
regime could be intentionally causing a wedge 
between Washington and Beijing relations. The 
future of the Six-Party Talks is not very bright since 
it seems that member states are too concerned with 
their individual priorities. If the talks fail, each party 
is bound to incur a certain amount of loss [11]. 
Moreover, there will be increased tension since each 
party will not be sure what other options will be 
taken.  
There seems at this stage, no impetus for the Six-
Party talks to restart and if there were to do so it is 
doubtful how much impact they would have. This is 
because it is evident that North Korea continues to 
refuse to budge on its policy. Such a continued stall is 
best demonstrated by the fact that the talks around 
supply chain have dragged on for a very long period 
of time and yet very few tangible results have been 
experienced.  
 What options exist for Beijing in the event that the 
peaceful negotiation process collapses? First, there 
will be huge pressure from the United States to cut 
economic aid to North Korea. This may be a difficult 
course of action for Beijing to take since it would 
accelerate the decline in influence that it has on 
Pyongyang. In addition, freezing aid may cause 
North Korea to experience economic collapse leading 
to the collapse of the regime and subsequent regional 
instability [8]. Policy advisors are of the opinion that 
China entered too deep into a crisis that mainly was a 
concern of the United States. In Northeast Asia, 
Japan already has nuclear weapons and it is, 
therefore, a major player [7]. As its interests shift the 
benefits that China receives from the U.S. will 
determine the amount of pressure it will put on North 
Korea, and will likely have the strongest impact on 
the regional situation. While talks seem to have failed 
beyond recovery at this stage, there exists a capacity 
for players such as Russia to reassert their roles. With 
China’s diminishing importance for North Korea as it 
appears to be using the issue to further its own goals 
with the U.S. there is a strong possibility that North 
Korea will look to Russia for support. Russian 
successes in Syria will mean that not only will it be 
possible for it to restart stalled negotiations, but that 
it may well be looking for a way to reduce U.S. 
global dominance. However the situation unfolds, the 
eventual disarmament of the North Korean Nuclear 
program will come will profound changes, these 
changes will either secure the Kim regimes place at 
the international negotiating table, or come about as a 
result of the regimes removal. 
 The ultimate aim of the talks is the ending of North 
Korea’s nuclear program, however, for North Korea 
the dismantling of the nuclear program is not a desire 
by itself, only when its other security concerns are 
addressed can it fulfil this goal of the talks, the 
nuclear program is not so much a direct nuclear 
deterrent as it is a bargaining tool and one of very 
few they have. The problem here lies that other 
countries are unwilling to satisfy all the other security 
needs of North Korea until their own private needs 
are met, throughout the region these are diverse, 
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